UNITED STATES ROTORCRAFT TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT: IS THERE A LACK OF A VISION?
The development of a weapon system begins with an identified need and then flows to the development, production, and fielding of that weapon system. A known philosophy for materiel developers of Army weapon systems is the desire to continually refine and/or update the systems' capabilities. In order to identify and refine the capabilities a plan or a vision for the incorporation of new technologies or concepts should be in place and preferably documented. "Write it down. Written goals have a way of transforming wishes into wants; cant's into cans; dreams into plans; and plans into reality. Don't just think it -ink it!" 1 The Army is very good at documenting policy, plans and other pertinent information. 2 However, drafting and documenting a long-term strategy for a specific weapon system or family of systems can be a daunting task with so many stake holders involved and the determination of who is the lead. In the case of rotorcraft the Army, as defined by project reliance and by charter, is responsible for rotorcraft Science and Technology (S&T). 3 The following analysis suggests that there is a vision for the Army's rotary-wing aircraft fleet and that any reduction in investments in technology by the United States (U.S.) is a result of the person's perception and not reality. Helicopter segment is in a long-term upswing in demand from both the military and commercial sectors and that the upswing is primarily due to replacements. The POM is comprised of the Descriptive Summaries or R-Forms and P-Forms. An important issue to note here is that the Army, as the lead service in Rotorcraft S&T (and subsequently the AMRDEC), is responsible for Rotorcraft S&T and thus responsible for some of the specific PE lines on the R-Forms for RDTE 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3. Further, as the AMRDEC develops these R-Forms for RDTE 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3, they obtain input/feedback from the rotorcraft project offices and other stake holders. From the aforementioned POM lines, Army Aviation has planned funding for research and development in fundamental research (RDTE 6.1 and 6.2) and transition to aircraft platforms (RDTE 6.3), however most RDTE funding for Army aviation is at the 6.7 level which is for the incorporation of materials and concepts on currently fielded systems. The amount of RDTE 6.7 reflects a concerted effort to modernize/recapitalize/reset existing rotorcraft versus developing new designs. 48 The second key take-home is "The Roadmap" chart which presents the rotorcraft mission for the near term, the POM years, the Extended Planning Period years, and FY 2025 and beyond. 49 
One final document warranting consideration is the 2007 DoD Research and
Engineering Strategic Plan. The plan describes its purpose as the collective guide to DoD investments and management of priorities. 50 The vision and mission of DoD research and engineering is to provide the "investment to provide superior systems with the capabilities to defeat any adversary on any battlefield". 51 For the Army the plan states that the vision is to "pursue technologies that will enable the future force, while simultaneously seizing opportunities to enhance the current force". 52 
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What Others are Thinking When no specific document identifying a vision for Army rotorcraft was identified the selected alternative means to determine the vision and/or status of the Army rotorcraft sector was to conduct a survey and/or to interview the interested parties. The intent of the survey and/or interviews was to obtain a perspective of where the rotorcraft sector RDTE investment currently stands and where it is heading from the point of view of the companies, people (Government and Industry), and professional organizations that have an interest in rotorcraft. 53 The results of the survey provided little benefit to the research as the only participants were two associations. The only other response was from one company and they noted that they did not have the time to participate in an academic research project. 54 However, it was through a daisy chain of information sharing from the survey results received and personal contacts that the following opinions and data-sets were identified.
The "Dip" Concept. In a paper to the American Helicopter Society Specialist's Conference on Aeromechanics in January of 2008, University of Maryland professor J.
Gordon Leishman refers to a learning curve that depicts one's opinion of technical competence (and improved understanding) against time and effort and that after a period of "qualitative understanding and postdictive capability" and before working harder at the problem is a period of "comfort zone" and a "dip". 55 Professor Leishman further suggests that in the world of aeromechanics the dip is not just technologically related but a more complex set of dynamics that include education, the ability to conduct experiments, leadership, planning, goal setting, culture, and funding levels.
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Though the reasons for the "dip" are complex, crossing over the dip is dependant upon two basic issues; technological and effective leadership, and that funding plays a key role to both.
Rotary-Wing Revitalization Project.
In an unpublished report from the Aerospace Industries Association a Study Group, that included representatives from Bell Helicopter, Boeing, and Sikorsky, looked at the effects of decisions made by the United
States and its effect on the rotorcraft industrial base. The Study Group findings reiterate professor Leishman's notion that rotorcraft aeromechanics is unique and that it requires professionally trained experienced designers and that that pool of individuals is shrinking. The report notes that collectively the American rotorcraft industry has "invested substantial internal research and development funding to keep the technical staff operating while hoping for new programs starts". 57 The report further notes that the military market for rotorcraft is twice that of the commercial sector and those military requirements are what drive innovations. 58 However, the Army being the lead service in rotorcraft technology actually invests less in RDTE than the Navy and the Air Force for hardware development and that less than five percent of the Army RDTE budget is dedicated towards the rotorcraft fleet. 59 The report does suggest that the decline in RDTE budgets is somewhat attributed to meeting the current GWOT operational demands. 60 In a confirmation of these findings the April 2008 issue of Rotor and Wing
Magazine concludes that "the Pentagon and its agencies form the engine of rotorcraft R&D in the United States" and that the commercial sector will not be able to make up the difference. 61 In a second report from the Aerospace Industries Association a correlation between the current GWOT operations and investment is also drawn in that "Funding for investment is gradually being squeezed from the baseline defense budget as military personnel and operations and maintenance costs take an increasing share of defense resources". 62 Mr. Gladwell further noted that a "Band-Aid" solution is actually the best kind of solution because it involves solving a problem with the minimum amount of effort, time and cost". 70 The Army Aviation Modernization Plan presentation chart is one "Band-Aid" solution to reverse the apparent decline in rotorcraft technology investments.
Additionally, the Army and by association the DoD rotorcraft sector has the POM (with the respective R-Forms) and the ASTMP as its vision along with planned funding.
From the perspective of RDTE investments made by foreign governments, no recent data was discovered concerning their rotorcraft technology investments and therefore no comparison can be made with the United States. 71 
Conclusion
Having a written vision is important to transforming an aspiration to reality. In the Government and commercial sectors, having the monetary issues planned and available is just as important. The lack of a vision does not necessarily mean that the funding associated with it will decline. On the reverse, having a vision will not necessarily result in an increase of monetary and other resources. Not to be discounted is the possibility that was implied within these findings is that the apparent decline in the investment of RDTE in rotorcraft is partially tied to the current GWOT operational demands and the increased cost of conducting research and development rather than not having a vision. Clearly, the Army rotorcraft community (and by charter the DoD rotorcraft community) would be well served to update and publish the ASSP and to continue with regularly scheduled Home-on-Homes'.
Highlighted within the ASSP is the implementation of the TATM process and the necessity to prioritize requirements within the fiscal means. In concert with the ASSP is the development of the aviation R-Forms which needs to utilize the TATM process and prioritization method. All the pieces are there to think and ink a roadmap -a vision. 29 The level of detail in the "Greenbook" does not present details at the commodity levels (e.g. Missile, Aviation, etc.). . Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that investments in rotorcraft RDTE is comparable to the DoD RDTE trend. The Industrial Base report also notes that the unmanned sector is expected to take a large portion of the RDTE investment.
